

## **Human Development and Democratic Governance: An Analysis**

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### **Abstracts**

*This article describes the impact of democratic governance on human development and growth. The idea of development as freedom is incorporated into the classic debate of democracy's impact on development. This study is qualitative in nature. Democracy is measured by freedom house political rights and civil liberties. Democratic governance is an important component for economic growth and human development. Moreover, the result indicate that democracy have positive effect on changes in human development .These findings strongly supported the claim that human development is compatible with, and even strengthened by, human freedom and political democracy. Finally these finding also have some important policy implications, suggestions that democracy promotion are important as long as human development, rather than economic growth.*

**Keywords:** Human Development, Democratic Governance, Economic Growth

### **Introduction**

Human development is aimed at expanding people's capabilities and choices that permit them to lead long, healthy and creative lives and enable them to involve you in decision-making touching their lives. Its uniqueness includes people's empowerment, equity of opportunities, sustainability, and human security and freedom.

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Democracy is the most vital and essential element for managing the affairs of society systematically. In a broader sense democracy encompasses the leading features; fair and free election process, supremacy of the constitution, the rule of law, and freedom for the people. In other words democratic state must practice the principles of equal citizenship irrespective of religion, caste, ethnicity and regional background. It must also ensure equality of opportunity to all for advancement in social, political and economic domains and guarantee security of life and property to its citizens.

The historic origin of democracy roots in Greek city states of 5<sup>th</sup> century B.C, with Athens the most prominent example. According to Abraham Lincoln democracy is “Government of the people, by the people, for the people”.

In 1992, 24.8% of population was living free in democratic countries. In 2007, this ratio was increased till 45%. Francis Fukuyama strengthens the democracy after the cold war by writing books like ‘End of History’ and ‘Lastman’. Samuel P Huntington, who wrote ‘Clash of Civilization’, promoted the democracy. Most nations got independence and started democracy. In 1941, Freedom House was established in US, this house opposes the dictatorship. Democracy features which energies political rights and civil liberty.




Figure 1: Components of Quality of Democracy

### **Philosophical History about Democracy and Development**

Mainly, there are two points of view in ancient discussion between those who are having positive ideas about democracy's effect on human development and those who are suspicious, share one basic conjecture: democracy has relatively similar relationship to developmental outcomes. Yet, new democracies and old democracies are not the same. While new democracies are prone to a host of problems associated with regime transition, older, more institutionalized democracies generally enjoy higher-quality governance (Kapstein and Converse 2008; Keefer 2006). It would be surprising, surely, if the human development performance of countries moving from authoritarian to democratic rule were considerably improved over the course of the consecutive year or decade. It is assumed, however, that if a

democratic government is maintained for a long period duration the net effect of that tenure will be positive for the well-being of its citizens. Note that regimes do not begin again, *de novo*, with each calendar year. Where one is today depends critically upon where one has been. Historical work suggests that deep legacies can be constructed through democracy and authoritarianism, extending back several decades, perhaps even centuries (Collier and Collier 1991; Hite and Cesarini 2004). It follows that we should concern ourselves with the assembled effect of these historical assets, not merely their contemporary status. We argued, therefore, that the effects of political institutions are likely to unfold over time, sometimes a great deal of time and that these secular effects are aggregated. Let us consider four possible causal pathways associating democracy and human development (McGuire 2004; Ross 2006), in order to consider the possible time-dependent nature of this relationship. First, competition among elites for voters' favor should produce a situation in which elites are accountable to the republic or, at least, to a plurality of the voting electorate. Since widespread human misery is unknown, the leaders elected democratically may be more likely to concern themselves with issues of human development than leaders who maintain their positions through other means (Lake and Baum 2001). To be sure, authoritarian leaders might also be concerned with possibly destabilizing effects of widespread poverty. However, they may be more likely to weather this kind of bad news than their democratic counterparts because they face a much smaller selectorate (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). As long as the authoritarian regimes core constituency (e.g., the military, ruling party and economic elites) is well compensated, it is unlikely that the sufferings of the masses will

threaten their control over the state. A noteworthy example of this can be found during the China's Great Leap Forward (Kane 1989; Riskin 1995). The massive starvation that result in the wake of Mao's disastrous reforms, which may qualify as the largest number of government induced deaths in recorded history, did not threaten Mao's leadership or the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. It is difficult to imagine such an event occurring in a democratic setting without serious negative consequences for those in power. The accountability argument is quite convincing when applied to disastrous policy outcomes such as famine, and the empirical results are strong. To date, no large-scale famine has occurred in a full-fledged democracy (Dreze and Sen 1989). Yet, for more complex developmental policies, where the failures are not obvious, less dramatic, and less easily tied to the prevailing government, the principal-agent logic attenuates. There is no conclusive reason why a democratically elected government would benefit from incurring present costs for the sake of future gains unless the time horizons of those elites have shifted to a longer-term perspective. Indeed, we do not expect long-sighted policies to derive from a recently democratized polity, where institutions are in flux, parties are nascent, and voter affiliations temporary. Faced with political uncertainty and instability, politicians face incentives to pursue short-run goals at the expense of long-term development (Haggard 1991; Keefer 2006). Indeed, in a new democracy there is little assurance that the democratic framework will hold; a country's most recent election may be its last. Under these circumstances, it is understandable that politicians and voters might adopt policies where the pay-offs should not be long term but short termed. In a longstanding democracy, by contrast, it seems plausible that

leaders might find it in their interest to follow policies where the benefits lie far off in the future. Here, actors may assume that free and fair elections will continue. Regular alternation in power lowers the short-run stakes of a given election. The losing party may reasonably expect to regain power at a later date. This means that noble actions taken while a party is in office may have beneficial consequences for that party long after their term of office has expired. As an example, one might consider the enormous political benefits reaped by the (U.S.) Democratic Party in the postwar era from the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935. Second, the institutions of democracy tend to foster a well-developed civil society. This is because political rights and civil rights are highly connected, and the existence of civil rights usually leads, over time, to a dense network of voluntary associations, which may be religious or secular, national or international, issue-specific or broadly pitched (Parker 1994). In turn, these voluntary associations are often instrumental in providing services for the poor, perhaps in conjunction with official state bodies and/or international actors. They may also be instrumental in campaigning for legislation that addresses the needs of the poor and improves the quality of public administration (Sondhi, 2000). Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are appearing to perform a critical role in child vaccination campaigns, in campaigns for the treatment of HIV/AIDS, in education and health care, and in many other policies that directly affect the general welfare (Gauri & Khaleghian 2002; Gauri and Lieberman 2006; Lake and Baum 2001; McGuire 2010). The evolution of civil society is a long-term process. Voluntary associations and NGOs do not spring forth overnight. Thus, in so far as strong civil societies encourage better governance and

greater attention to the needs of the less advantaged citizens in a society, we can expect these causal mechanisms to kick in only with the passage of time. Again, the age of democracy would seem to matter when considering human development outcomes. Third, democracy may serve to inaugurate a culture of equality that empowers oppressed groups. In the process of granting formal citizenship rights to out groups-lower castes and classes, peasants, racial, ethnic, and religious minorities-democracy may foster a political dynamic in which these groups conceptualize their interests as a matter of rights and take a correspondingly aggressive approach to satisfying those rights in the political, social, and economic spheres (Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998; Piven and Cloward 1977; Rubin 1997). This political dynamic, once initiated, may have important impact for societal human development in so far as it leads to an extension and improvement of government services and increased utilization of those services. Again, it seems reasonable to suppose that this process of change would occur only over a period of decades, if not centuries (e.g., the American civil rights movement). Finally, we expect that older democracies will benefit from greater institutionalization in the political sphere. Although political institutionalization is difficult to define, there seems to be general consensus that procedures in a well-institutionalized polity are functionally differentiated, regularized (and hence predictable), professionalized (including meritocratic methods of recruitment and promotion), rationalized (explicable, rule based, and non arbitrary), and infused with value (Huntington 1968; Levitsky 1998; Polsby 1968). Most long-standing democracies fit this description. They mark highly advanced, highly diversified systems of governance, involving both formal bureaucracies and

extra-constitutional organizations such as interest groups, political parties, and other nongovernmental organizations. Probably, democracy serves as a rough indicator of its degree of institutionalization. By contrast, the length of time an authoritarian regime has been in existence may have little or no bearing on its level of institutionalization. Witness: the latter days of Nicaragua under Somoza or Iraq under Saddam Hussein.<sup>2</sup> We suspect that the reasons for this stem directly from their systems of rule. Where power is personalized, as it is in many authoritarian settings, the development of legal-bureaucratic authority is virtually impossible. In particular, leadership succession is difficult to contain within regularized procedures and promises a period of transition fraught with uncertainties. Thus, there may be little continuity between that regime (a term we employ here in its broader sense) and its successor, if an autocrat or dictator adheres to consistent policy objectives during his or her rule. The only feature of a long-standing democracy, by contrast, is its capacity to fix the problem of leadership succession without chaos and without extraordinary discontinuities in policy and in political organization. The framework remains flawless, and this means that the process of institutionalization may continue, despite the occasional bang in the road. More importantly, we suspect that the institutionalization of power leads to greater gains within a democratic setting than in an authoritarian setting. Institutionalization matters more under democracy. Consider the problem of establishing social order and stability in a republic and settling the problems of coordination (Hardin 1999). Non institutionalized nations are unstable and inefficient, almost by definition, for there are no approved procedures for reaching decisions. However, in an authoritarian setting, a Hobbesian order



may be established simply and efficiently by command and force. Rule by command, insofar as it is successful, can be imposed with minimum loss of time and little negotiation; the threat of arm is immediate. Consequently, there is less need for highly institutionalized procedures for accommodating differences and establishing the force of law. The sovereign may rule directly. In a democratic setting, by contrast, settling clash is quiet complicated and generally takes a good deal of time. Somehow, everyone must agree upon (or at least agree to respect) the imposition of society-wide policy solutions that involve uneven costs and benefits. In order to handle these stereotypical political problems, a democratic polity has little choice but to institutionalize procedures for settlement among rival constituencies and organizations. Once these procedures are established, we expect them to be more effective in settling differences and finding ideal solutions than would be command imposed from above. Indeed, whatever centripetal tendencies are inherent in democracy are more likely to be in evidence when those democratic arrangements have been in operation for some time. For this reason, the thesis of democratic overload is much more compelling when applied to new democracies than when applied to old. Democratization is often a exuberant, obstreperous affair. Established democracies, by contrast, tend to be more restrained. In particular, the norm of cumulative change is more likely to be accepted. Thus, given sufficient time, we expect that democracies will provide greater stability and more efficient public policies. Arguably, the problem of overload arises not from institutional sclerosis (Olson 1982) but rather from insufficient institutionalization (Huntington 1968). This provides yet another reason to suppose that long-term democracies may adopt brilliant social

policies and may implement them with greater perseverance and flexibility. If democracy survives its often tumultuous youth, indicators of human development should demonstrate marked improvements—even if no immediate improvement was registered in the initial transition from authoritarian rule. Democracy, it is concluded, that it is best considered as a stock, rather than level, concept. Two dimensions of democracy, time and regime type, must be gauged together in order to explain a country's human development capacity.

### **The Human Development Paradigm**

Human developments theories are largely based upon argument that focus on people's capabilities are more important than wholly based upon their possessions and benefits. By keeping this point of view also argues that economic growth and human and socioeconomic growth's development are different from each other. Concentrating on the determinants of human development by contrasting two largest countries of the world laid a great emphasis on the importance of government choices and policies hold the view that in China, though the economic growth rates have been higher but people's civil and political rights still have limitations because of the lack of democracy and so, it also hampers human development. On the other hand, although India has low economic growth rates, but to democratic rights have contributed to human development to a large extent. By following this approach, GDP per capita's alternative was developed as HDI, as wider indicator of quality of life and human development (UNDP 1990; Haq 1995). The UNDP, for example, gives the definition of human development as "a process of enlarging human choices". The HDI, is then, constructed by mingling measures of long and

healthy life, way into knowledge and a decent standard of living. Still, “human development is incomplete without human freedom. While, different aspects of human freedom are captured by HDI, the political aspects of civil and political liberties are not included in this list. As mentioned by the UNDP, it is therefore an important experimental task to further investigate the impending relation between human freedom and development. As a result of this, testing this relationship empirically is the main aim of this study. Since, HDI applies a wider view on development as freedom than economic measure of GDP per capita, democracy is more closely related to the human development that is the first proposition in government, and should support human development, while economic growth is not necessary. Lastly, i, as measured by HDI than it is economic development, as measured by GDP per capita. As discussed by Haq (2008), increase in civil and political rights expand people’s choices by change t can be seen that HDI is not free from criticism. HDI’s high correspondence with GDP per capita measure is the main apprehension, making some skeptics to hold the view that it is almost unnecessary (McGillivray 1991; McGillivray & White 1993).

### **Democratic Governance and Human Development**

As we have seen above, democratic governance is the most human-development-friendly system of governance. Why and how does the democratic governance specifically affect human development performance? To take first the example of generic human development indicators, democratic governance can help to increase life expectancy, improve adult literacy and school enrollment, and raise per capita income by providing a system of government that responds to the needs of the people. If the people

desire better health care, education and quality of life and we must assume that these are universal human aspirations democratic governance ensures that elected representatives act according to the will of the people in an accountable way. It is clear, however, that by looking at the more qualitative indicators of development the real benefits of democratic governance become clear. . It also provides local governance and civil society mechanisms through which citizens can voice their concerns, make decisions at a local level and inform their elected representatives of pressing issues.

By providing local government structures that distribute resources in an equitable, transparent and accountable way, democratic governance also increases citizen access to services. Decentralization, when democratic, creates local structures that can make decisions and distribute services and resources independent of a central authority. This makes governance more efficient and responsive to local needs. Decentralized mode of program design and implementation improves delivery of and access to such services as primary health care, education, and shelter and low-income housing Democratic governance can also reduce income disparities and provide equality of opportunities by protecting the rights of minorities from the “*tyranny of the majority.*”

Help to encourage more women to participate in the political process. Although the issue is still vigorously debated, there is some evidence that democratic governance can increase levels of employment and income. For example, Adam Przeworski finds that while “political regimes do not affect the rate of growth of total income...population grows faster under dictatorships, [hence] per capita incomes grow faster under democracies.”

Przeworski also finds that, irrespective of the specific linkages between economic indicators and democratic Governance. Democratic governance provides an institutional framework for freedom of press, active role of civil society organization, and checks and balances among the executive, legislative and judicial branches – factors that are critical to combat corruption and improve transparency and accountability in governance.

Finally, democratic governance can help to improve a society's health and education's indicators and protect human security by providing the foundation to build inclusive communities, provide care and equal access to health and education services. Democratic societies are more likely to invest in health and education because it is the people who lead the development agenda.

Democracies are also less likely to go to war with one another or suffer from internal strife or famine.




Figure 2: The What, the How and the Why of Democratic Governance

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By examining the set of these characteristics, a country's development performance and predictors thereof become clearer. These critical generic characteristics include life expectancy, adult literacy, school enrollment and per capita income. Also critical to human development performance are characteristics in a society that are more difficult to quantify but are more revealing. These include access to services; participation in decision making; income disparities; equality of opportunities; level of employment; economic growth by community; health and education indicators; and human security. This is why it is important to disaggregate, wherever possible, human development indicators so that they reveal development disparities along the basis of ethnicity, gender, age or other basis. In line with this, specific indices have been developed to measure such things as gender empowerment, human poverty (including access to water, health services and sanitation), education, and access to information flows, economic performance, macroeconomic structure, environmental status, political life, crime, personal distress and other components of development.

### **Endorsement of Human Development with Good Governance**

The concepts of good governance and human rights are commonly reinforcing, both being based on core principles of participation, accountability, transparency and State liability. Human rights strengthen good governance frameworks. Word Good Governance means to protect the humanity'. It develops from America 1776 and French revolution 1789. Universal declaration of human Right by general assembly resolution 217A (iii) Express the value of humanity. The will of people shall be the basic Authority of the government. Its objective is to promote and consolidate

the democracy or Humanity. They require: going beyond the ratification of human rights treaties, integrating human rights effectively in legislation and State policy and practice; establishing the promotion of justice as the aim of the rule of law; understanding that the credibility of democracy depends on the effectiveness of its response to people's political, social and economic demands; promoting checks and balances between formal and informal institutions of governance; effecting necessary social changes, particularly regarding gender equality and cultural diversity; generating political will and public participation and awareness; and responding to key challenges for human rights and good governance, such as corruption and violent conflict.

### **Allocation and Management of Resources**

Good governance addresses the allocation and management of sources to respond to collective problems by the principle of participation, transparency, accountability, rule of law, effectiveness, equality and strategic vision.

### **Promotes the Freedom**

Good governance promotes freedom from poverty, freedom from deprivation, freedom from fear, freedom from violation and sustains the environment of women advancement.

### **Promotes the equality**

Good governance produces the opportunity of equality distribution of benefits from growth.

### **Stable Democracy and Concept of Governance**

Most stable democracy tends to have lower level of poverty with the help of good governance.

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**Effectiveness:** Governments must govern. Deliverables that have been promised or are needed must be delivered and this is the most important criteria if good governance. There is no good in non-governance.

**Inclusiveness:** This is a principle aspect of process. All those who are involved in governance, those who are governed and the stake holders who are impacted by governing decisions must be including in strategic decision making.

**Transparency:** Transparency is a safeguard against corruption and also an important ingredient of legitimacy. Effectiveness often depends on trust and transparency enables trust.

**Accountability:** Governments are accountable. They are accountable to their mandates and their constituencies. They should deliver goods effectively and transparently or be held responsible. This can also be a motivation for good governance.

**Rule of Law:** Rule of law is an important aspect of democracies. A culture of law abidingness cannot be nurtured in societies if the governments themselves are not law abiding. It is important to make good decisions but ensure that they are within the existing legal framework.


**Proactive:** Most models of good governance advocate responsiveness. We think responsiveness is good but not good governance. Those responsible must be *proactive* – anticipate and act. Good governance is the anticipation of crisis and preparation in advance.

**Efficiency:** Governments are often accused of waste. We believe that one of the key benchmarks of good governance is efficiency.



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**Competitiveness:** we believe that public governance should borrow some aspects of corporate culture specially the spirit of competitiveness in order to deliver goods quicker and better. This is a unique aspect of the model of good democratic governance.



**Figure 3: Institution Building and Capacity Building**

## **Conclusion**

To conclude, human development performance can be enhanced through enhancing the quality of democracy including the devolution of power and resources, protection of human rights, removal of corruption and speeding up of justice. In such an environment, the poor will be freer to self-organize and develop their capacity for collective action. In today's globalized world, the prospects for enhancing the quality of democracy are greater. Citizens globally enjoy increased access to information and comparative experiences. Corruption and human rights abuses are more difficult to hide from scrutiny. And civil society is becoming more active on regional and global levels. In short, we can say that democracy and human development are part and parcel of each other. If democracy prevails in the country there will be high growth of development.

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