

China-Russia Relations after the Cold War

Muhammad Muzaffar¹ & Imran Khan²

Abstract

After thirty years of apparently unbeatable distrust and bilateral crises, the post-Cold War era has observed an extraordinary regeneration and strengthening the relationships between the China and Russia. Several primary issues and dynamics contributing to the mutual reconciliation of the previous twenty years continue still to be examined. This article enhances the role of some issues intertwined in this development: the growth of formal relations between the two countries. Bilateral structures, which were completely vague until the 1990s, have now quickly multiplied into a thick system of commissions and institutionalized exchanges and including almost all segments of interaction between Russia and China. Furthermore, both states are progressively cooperating in the structure of bilateral institutions and global organizations. This research observes the role of institutionalization in Sino-Russian dealings and that dealings has played in empowering both countries to furnace a nearer functioning association with each other.

Keywords: China, Russia, Institution Building, Bilateral Cooperation, Cold War

Introduction

The Russia and China challenges a number of superlatives: Russia is the 9th largest country by population and the 4th largest country by total landmass in the world, respectively, China is the largest country by population and also the largest country by total landmass in the world. They are the

¹ Ph. D Scholar, Department of Politics & IR International Islamic University Islamabad

² Ph.D. Scholar, Department of Political Science and International Relations, GC University, Faisalabad

world's leading military powers and main global economic players. In United Nations Security Council, both states are veto powers and both organize the nuclear weapons. Both states also share the over 4000 kilometers long border (Bjoern, 2013).

Dissipations have similarly considered the way of relationships between the both neighboring states: Insufficient mutual interactions between significant countries in current past have been characterized by variations as dangerous as those that happened between Russia and China. In the 1950s, after a primary influence of stated socialist 'brotherhood' and deep political and financial assistance, Moscow and Beijing quickly charged into an aggressive tactical hostility. In 1969, persistent territorial disputes and joint aggression terminated in a conflict and in reaffirmed joint nuclear dangers. The bilateral dealings were finally normalized in 1989. After the Cold War, dealings between the reformist People's Republic of China and the newly-founded Russian Federation have taken an opportunity in the reverse direction, towards an extraordinary regeneration and strengthening of relations between China and Russia. After three decades of apparently unbeatable distrust and mutual crises, this endangered to increase into armed battle. Since the end of 1990s, Russia and China have developed a close association (Bjoern, 2013).

In the last years of the Soviet Union, although the bases for settlement between the two states were arranged, remarkable development towards joint collaboration has been organized since the 1990s. Presently, Russian and Chinese representatives generally proclaim that relationships between their states are "*at their best in history*" (Mu Xuequan, 2007, November 2). and

predictors have entitled the expansion of associations with China the “*greatest Russian foreign policy success of the post-Soviet period*” (Bobo Lo, 2004).

However the relations between the Russia and China has been regularly increasing up to the current era, this has occurred that insufficient of the reasons of joint pressure in the earlier have been categorically determined, although China’s intense development in different sectors of life and political influence has developed a cause of unrest for Russia and other neighbor states. The two countries have combined interests in emerging their financial links and managing their defense plans, but China’s increasing economic and military power has been observed by many thinkers in Russia as a divergent danger for the state. Meanwhile, many researchers in Beijing have considered Russia as an unpredictable and erratic global player. So, it was not an apparent choice for Russian and Chinese thinkers to have determined for increasing mutual collaboration. Previously the experience of ongoing hesitation among forecasters as to what the main reasons of bilateral settlement have been, this research purposes to enhance the part of some of the influences and factors tangled in this development. Specially, the amount of one such aspect is observed through the growth of multilateral and bilateral organizations between both countries. Bilateral official dealings had been completely inattentive until the mid-1990s, have now speedily multiplied into a thick system of commissions, institutionalized exchanges and functioning groups, including almost all segments of bilateral collaboration and support (Bjoern, 2013).

The development and spread of joint organizations has been almost entirely disregarded in the existing studies. In the current period, not a

particular research has dedicated itself to an investigation of the institutionalization of the affiliation between China and Russia. No inclusive status of the joint policy-making organizations shaped between Russia and China presently exists. Because of this oversight, the majorities of researchers to date have focus on geopolitics and also defined the affiliation of both states as a comparatively delicate structure with arguable scenarios. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is the only multilateral organization which connecting the both states (Stephen, 2011).

Theoretical Framework

Modifications of Realist and Neorealist approaches can draw the impact on the degree to which outside general factors, as well as geopolitical interests and objectives have overstated Russian and Chinese strategy towards each other. John Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz's Structural Realist theories, and Stephen Walt's balance of threat theory classify general circumstances that would obliged to both states to unite against the threat of a third power like U.S. Randall Schweller's bandwagoning approach can be engaged to evaluate whether Sino-Russian collaboration was motivated by mutual revisionist ideas. Neorealist theory delivers a significant model for observing the strategic calculus of Russian and Chinese officials in their bilateral dealings (Kenneth, 1979).

This research also observes to what amount the procedure of institution building has donated to nurturing and maintaining mutual reconciliation. It works logical conceptions copied from Neoliberal Institutionalism theory and relates them in the environment of numerous case

studies of institution building between Russia and China (Robert & Joseph, 1989).

Since 1991, the major powers of the world have experienced intense modifications in status: China, prospered in military and economic transformations, appeared as a rising power on the global arena; Russia, extremely involved in political and economic changes, lost the status of super power; and the U.S converted the only remaining international superpower after it had vanished its Cold War opponent. The theoretical basis for strategic partnership between China and Russia mentions to the system of contrasting a unipolar world and sponsoring a multipolar system in the world. The components that China and Russia have been continually voicing their failure with the unipolar arrangement of the globe and have been yelling for the development of another change of energy built on multipolar framework. An examination of Russian-Chinese connections in the post-Cold war era from the triangle viewpoint of the three states-China, Russia and the U.S gives us a comprehension of the earth of the reciprocal Russian-Chinese relations (Leksyutina, 2010).

Post-Cold War Cooperation between China and Russia

China-Russia relationships developed progressively after the demise of the Soviet Union. Russia monitored a path of amalgamation with the West during the era of President Yeltsin. The West (U.S and Europe) solved the financial difficulties of Russia. However, in the 1990s, Russia reshaped its foreign policy that was believed on the pro-Western significance and to be substituted towards a multipolar global system and counter the U.S hegemony in the world. This modification shaped the approach for a new strategy of

reconciliation towards China. The collaboration of Russia and China would implement the multipolar aim of the both states. In the mid-1990s, leaders of China, Jiang Zemin, and of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, decided to make a ‘strategic partnership’ between the both states (Paramonov & Stokov, 2006). A significant aspect of the growing friendship was that both China and Russia amalgamated alike viewpoints on progresses in the global field. Moscow and Beijing faced a unipolar system in the world and encouraged a multipolar global system as strategic allies. After the Cold War, U.S playing the main role in global arena – was contested, so an anti-U.S path was a vital aspect of the Russia-China’s strategic relationship. In April 1997, this assessment on global politics was made in the form of a settlement (Smith, 2000).

Russia and China understood very well that their border issues should be resolved. Under the supervision of Gorbachev, the Soviet Union contracted the first border treaty in May 1991 and second agreement was contracted under the supervision of Yeltsin in 1996. In 2004, an additional agreement on the boundaries was settled in the era of Putin when Russia surrendered some areas of the *Ussuri* and *Amur* rivers to China (Trenin, 2012). The Chinese and Russian foreign ministers contracted another border agreement in July 2008, which developed the differentiation of the 4,300 km border (Blagov, 2008 b).

In 1999, Russian and Chinese regional authorities signed approximately 100 agreements for the economic cooperation between the two states. In 2000, under the supervision of Vladimir Putin, Russian and Chinese cooperation established an extensive improvement. Putin was committed that a decent affiliation with China would nurture his objective of firming Russian prominence in the global field. For both events, military strike in Kosovo in

1999 and the U.S attack on Iraq in 2003 – would additionally reinforce their relations and their bilateral goal of a multipolar global system (Paramonov & Strokov, 2006).

In July 2000, President Putin visited China, causing in the passing of nine treaties on education, economic and military cooperation. Russia and China contracted a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 2001, which apparently comprised military collaboration in space, assistance on armed technologies, and new armament's sales and secret supplements on mutual defense (Cohen, 2001). After the breakdown of the USSR, the arrangements between China and Russia had produced in 13 meetings and more than 160 treaties till 2006. After the government of Putin, President Medvedev further strengthened Russia's relations with China. Medvedev first time reached in Beijing on official visit in May 2008. A joint declaration of Chinese President Hu Jintao and Russian President Medvedev comprised a lot of likeminded assessments of global issues, including the refusal of missile defense system of the U.S. Furthermore, both the states signed agreements on aerospace, nuclear energy and economic fields. President Putin made a visit to China in June 2012 and concentrated on the quickly developing financial relations between the two states and highlighted their integrated postures on burning global disputes. (Blagov, 2008).

Russia is the main weapons and military equipment dealer for China after the demise of the USSR. When Beijing was faced the uprising of Tiananmen in 1989, neither U.S nor the Europe were willing to provide the weapons to China. Russia then became the only base of weapons for China. This feature of military assistance helped both states (Trenin, 2012).

Russian-Chinese Economic and Trade Cooperation

Another section can be measured as a negative to a limited economic cooperation between China and Russia. The exchange of goods between the two states is immaterial in connection with more widespread exchanges of goods with the United States, Europe or Japan than with each other. For example, the related finance of Sino-Russian economic cooperation in 2008 hit \$ 56.8 billion, while China-U.S economic cooperation reached \$ 409 billion (Mathews, 2016). It may be that this is, with the continuous efforts from both sides, Russian, be extended as recently as Chinese trade feature - business exchanges from 1994 to 1999, was genuinely stable and moved to \$ 5.1 billion, in 2001, it came to \$ 10.7 billion, in 2005 \$ 29.1 billion and in 2007\$ 48.1 billion. While the exchange of goods as it may be closed continuously strong, the structure of exchange has not changed very much. China imports by Russia are driven by crude materials, the ferrous and non-ferrous metals, fish and apparatus. Russian imports by China are chemicals, shoes, furniture, toys, pottery, ceramics and foods approximately 36.7 per cent in 2008 (Mathews, 2016). The fact is that the relevant exchange is not ideal yet for Russia in the meantime, the evidence of completion of the Chinese and Russian economies. It is important to bring the size of financial cooperation between the two states in congruity with two-sided political relations level to give effect to the Russian-Chinese relations.

As far back relations between Russia and China gained momentum in the incredible power grip especially in the field of economic, in the mid, 1990s. Exchange and financial connections become a progressively important section of Sino-Russian relations. Russia and China declared in 1996 that they

would target to raise their general trade business to \$20 billion by the year 2000. But at the end of 1990s' economic activities between the two states stagnated at a low level \$7.7 billion (Trenin, 2012). At that time, the leadership of Chinese had to understand that the Yeltsin government and mostly the governors of the Russian border areas eventually presented little emblems of partaking the Chinese monetary image of collaboration and frankness and successfully engaged most of their earlier fortification attitude towards North East Asia. The Russian financial leaders also primarily exposed few attentions in China. The 1998 Russian monetary crisis further added to the inaction in mutual trade during the 1990s. Chinese decision-makers and merchants at the time were regularly bothered by apparently random and preventive Russian cost and permit rules, as well as an overall lack of financial management on the fragment of the Russian consultants (Gilbert, 2000). Moscow also responded calmly to some of Beijing's financial strategies in North-East Asia, such as the Chinese creativity to form a 'global city' on the *T'umen* River, through which China would have expanded a marketable port on the Sea of Japan. As a result, China and Russia was considered relatively minor commercial and economic transactions. In 2000, rapidly increased bilateral economic cooperation provides a fundamental basis for cooperation between China and Russia. However, both the countries have a lot of structural problems but the mutual trade has developed intensely after 1999. However, temporarily increased commercial involvement, the effects of the global recession was recovered rapidly by both countries. China and Russia was the largest trading partners with the mutual trade size reached \$88.2 billion in 2012 (Harbin, 2013, June 14).

Russian-Chinese Energy Cooperation

By a wide margin the most critical segment of Sino-Russian exchange is Russian vitality fares to China. The vitality division represents the immense guarantees, additionally the specific difficulties of reciprocal financial collaboration. At first sight, the Sino-Russian vitality relationship seems, by all accounts, to be “*a match made in paradise*” (Kyrre & Indra, 2007). In the previous three decades, China, through its brilliant mechanical development rates, has been a standout amongst the most quickly developing vitality buyers on the planet. At the same time, with Russia, China has one of the world's biggest asset supplies at its doorstep. Today, China has turned into the world's second-biggest purchaser and shipper of oil, behind the United States. As of now in 1993, China turned into a net merchant of oil. Since 2007, it has likewise been a net shipper of gaseous petrol, which is step by step turning into a more vital building piece of China's general vitality structure, despite the fact that it keeps on assuming an exceptionally minor part in it. Russia, then, is the world's biggest oil maker, representing 12% of worldwide oil generation in 2011 (as far as bbl/day) (Anton, 2010).

Russian-Chinese Geopolitics and Security Cooperation

Equalization of power and geostrategic targets have been recognized by numerous experts as the essential and deciding element of China's and Russia's common rapprochement since the finish of the Cold War. To numerous eyewitnesses, expanding reciprocal collaboration appeared to demonstrate the arrangement of a hostile to hegemonic partnership between two revisionist powers, and the respective relationship was in this way

normally described as “*a nexus, in which geopolitics is at the center and restriction to the rising scene request is the raison d’être*” (Gilbert, 2000).

While joint geopolitical resistance to the U.S was never again made as clear in reciprocal declarations, it kept on framing a vital measurement of China-Russia participation during the 2000s. In this manner, China and Russia were joined in their restriction to U.S. ballistic missile destroying – a ‘Joint Proclamation on the Subject of ABM’ was issued in July 2000 – and in addition the 2003 attack of Iraq. A routine of key conferences was started amongst Moscow and Beijing. A noteworthy respective report, the ‘Sino-Russian Arrangement of Good-Neighborliness and Benevolent Collaboration’, was passed in July 2001, specifying close participation on worldwide undertakings. Russia and China seemed to hold fundamentally the same as perspectives with respect to the coveted structure of the post-Cold War global request. The Russian and Chinese initiatives kept on attesting their joint wish to reinforce a ‘multipolar world request’ in most joint articulations and in many remarks made by high-positioning remote approach authorities. In practice, Moscow and Beijing nearly participated and exhibited a joint conciliatory front against U.S. interests on innumerable issues of worldwide significance, in particular on restricting furnished intercessions and administration change (Bates & Matthew, 2003).

Russian-Chinese Interaction under Different Organizations:

The fight against U.S global hegemony and striving for a multipolar international system, both the states have a subsequent strategy line of cooperation in Regional organizations – such as the SCO, CSTO, ASEAN and BRICS. From the first term of the presidency, Putin has been attentive of the

significance of this region to attain economic advantages, as a resource to improve Russia's Far East region, as well as for political motives, to support the position of Russia in this region and to respond the influence of U.S over this area. More precisely, Putin defined the Asia–Pacific region as the most important region for Russia and its neighbors in November 2000 (Smith, 2000).

Shanghai Cooperation Organization

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has member states from the regions of South-East Asia, Europe and Central Asia. The SCO is a regional organization which comprises Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan as associate countries, with Pakistan, Iran, India and Mongolia as observer countries (Haas, 2007 b). SCO associate countries have approximately 1.5 billion populations. The SCO delivers collaboration in economic, energy, military, political and cultural arenas. Both the states Russia and China actively participated in SCO. The SCO directed large military exercises, called 'Peace Missions' in 2005 and 2007. These exercises stress on the agenda of counter-terrorism. Although under the guidance of this organization, these exercises were controlled by China and Russia, and these are the leading players of the organization (Weitz, 2007).

The SCO organized main energy exporters –Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Iran as well as major energy importers – India and China – therefore the cooperation in energy sector made one of the important topics of this organization. Energy agreements were generally made on multilateral joint basis. In June 2006 at the SCO Summit, energy was openly put on the schedule as a key matter for the first time. President Putin stated the objective

of the establishing the 'Energy Club' under the SCO, in direction to improve a mutual development in the energy sector. Moreover, the 'Energy Club' was developed in Moscow on 3 July 2007. The principles of the 'Energy Club' describe that it links consumers, energy manufacturers and transit states in organizing energy policies, with the goal of developing energy security (Weitz, 2007).

CSTO

A significant feature of the security plan of the SCO was that China and Russia did not generally see eye-to-eye on a nearer association between the CSTO and the SCO. The expansion of nearer relations between the CSTO and SCO was not an easy procedure. Russia had the objective of taking the two associations closer together in 2003, for the aim of expanding the combat against militancy and the drug trade, but perhaps also to arrange an 'Eastern alliance' against Western impact in the Central Asia. In 2006, footsteps were prepared towards a magnification of dealings between the CSTO and the SCO. Secretary-General of SCO, Zhang Deguang described in May 2006 that the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the SCO had drilled the SCO Secretariat to develop collaboration with the CSTO (Smith, 2000).

ASEAN

The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967. The organization comprises on ten countries in South-East Asia. Its objectives include accelerating cultural development, social development and economic growth among its associates, Security of territorial peace and strength is the key objective of this organization. In 1976, a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in South-East Asia was signed under the

supervision of ASEAN. It organized objectives, for example regard for regional integrity, power, equity, autonomy and non-impedance in the inward matters of countries. ASEAN practices the TAC as a form of accord section for states that want to unite with this association. The China in 2003 and Russia in 2004 have joined the TAC (Haas, 2011).

Russia and China have acknowledged significant role of ASEAN in the development of Asian–Pacific regional organizations, such as the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS). At the end of the 1990s, Russia and China became more dynamic in ASEAN. Beijing and Moscow have presented to be well attentive of these organizations adjoining ASEAN, and have been keen to be a part of these institutions.

Subsidiary Organizations under the ASEAN: APEC, ARF and EAS

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) established in 1989. APEC is the Asian–Pacific regional economic forum for assisting trade, investment, financial development and cooperation. APEC's have the 21 member states and account for about 40 per cent of the world's population, about 44 per cent of world trade and approximately 55 per cent of world GDP (Rangsimaporn, 2009).

In July 1993, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was originated. Russia and China have joined the ARF in 1994. ARF comprises on 27 countries which are China, Russia and U.S, but also the Europe Union. The purpose of ARF is to discourse security and political matters of mutual interest and concern. The balancing of power was a main objective of its originators.

Therefore, the participation of China and Russia in regional negotiation was to be confirmed (Rangsimaporn, 2009).

The East Asia Summit (EAS) was established in 2005. In addition to APEC and ARF, Russia and China have also joined this grouping around ASEAN. EAS comprises on eighteen states. EAS conferences are held after the annual ASEAN Summit. The main objective of EAS also focuses on the political, financial, and security matters of the region, and improving stability and financial development (Haas, 2011).

BRICS

BRICS is a group of leading developing economies – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The grouping was presented in a Goldman Sachs report of 2003, emphasizing that by 2050 the first four countries would have become the largest and most dominant economies of the world, thus flouting U.S hegemony (Aris & Snetkov, 2011). The BRICS associates, comprising of around 3 billion individuals or half of the total populace of world, are all - aside from Russia emerging economic players that are attaining an important impact on regional and international matters.

Conclusion

The experience of the previous two decades demonstrates that Russia and China are not especially successful companions in the financial measurement. Except for vitality participation, general monetary communication looks distressing. Also, pushing financial recuperation and modernization of the country, Russia's pioneers don't appear to be ready to redirect their eyes from the Western capital and markets, while Beijing's capacities to help Russia around there are esteemed immaterial. It is

conceivable that an excessively close consideration of top initiative to the financial field makes the inverse impact. Beijing and Moscow improve in worldwide issues and security matters, where they have numerous comparable interests and regular practices. Thus, the concentration of their relations gradually moves to this region. The mutual associations between Russia and China after the 9/11 assaults characterize the loss of union of mutual threat observations regarding the U.S. The two states held concurrent perspectives on both economic and security threats; a 'full partnership' was more prospective, with firming collaboration in both economic and security fields. After the 2010, Russia-China relations support the sense of this 'full partnership', because both states have associatively confronted mounting threat and pressure from NATO, driven by the U.S. The U.S assumes an especially complex part in Russia-China relations. Russian policy-makers perceive that the Washington-Beijing tandem has turned into the most essential reciprocal association in international politics. Moreover, some in the security community consider China as a greater long-term threat to Russia than the U.S, and see the U.S as a potential partner in case China turns against Russia.

References

- Anton, D. (2010). Russia Overtakes Saudi Arabia as World Oil Production Leader, Paper, *RIA Novosti*.
- Aris, S. & Snetkov, A. (2011, February 14). Russia and the Narrative of BRIC, *Russian Analytical Digest*, No. 91.
- Bates, G. & Matthew, O. (2003). *Chinas New Journey to the West: Chinas Emergence in Central Asia and Implications for US Interests* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies).
- Bjoern, A. D. (2013). *China-Russia Relations after the Cold War: The Process of Institution-Building and Its Impact on the Evolution of Bilateral Cooperation*, London: Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Blagov, S. (2008a). Russia and China: United by Foreign Policy, Divided by Energy Prices, *EDM*, 27.
- Blagov, S. (2008 b). Russia, China Establish Stronger Economic Ties, *EDM*, 30 October.
- Bobo Lo, (2004). The Long Sunset of Strategic Partnership: Russias Evolving China Policy, *International Affairs*, Vol. 80, No.2, p. 296.
- Cohen, A. (2001). Putins Foreign Policy and US–Russian Relations, *Heritage Foundation*, Backgrounder No. 1406.
- Gilbert, R. (2000). *Sino-Russian Relations: Mutual Assessments and Predictions*, in: Sherman Garnett (ed.), *Rapprochement or Rivalry?: Russia-China Relations in a Changing Asia* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie).
- Gilbert, R. (2000). *Turning Fortresses into Free Trade Zones*, in: Garnett (ed.), *Rapprochement or Rivalry? Russia-China Relations in a Changing Asia*, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie.

- Haas, M. de. (2007 b). *The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Towards a Full-grown Security Alliance?* Clingendael Security Report 3, The Hague: Clingendael Institute.
- Haas, M. de. (2011). De veiligheidsoptiek van ASEAN”, *Internationale Spectator*, Vol. 65, No. 4, p. 205.
- Harbin, (2013, June 14). China-Russia Trade Volume to Hit 100 Bln USD in 2014, *Xinhua*.
- Kenneth Waltz, (1979). *Theory of International Politics*, London: Addison-Wesley.
- Kyrre, B. & Indra, Ø. (2007). A Match Made in Heaven? Strategic Convergence between China and Russia, *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 2.
- Leksyutina, Y. (2010). *Russian-Chinese Relations: Rapprochement or Rivalry?* Chair In Bev- Baillet Latour Working Papers No. 37: 1.
- Mathews, T, (2016). The Effect of *Chinese* Macroeconomic News on Australian Financial Markets, *Bulletin*, December Quarter.
- Mu Xuequan, (2007, November 2). Chinese Premier: China-Russia Relations at Most Important Stage, *Xinhua* (2.11.2007), available online at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/200711/02/content_6995010.htm
- Paramonov, V. & Stokov, A. (2006). *Russian-Chinese Relations: Past, Present and Future*, Russian Series 06/46E, September, Swindon: CSRC, UK Defence Academy.
- Rangsimaporn, P. (2009). Russias Search for Influence in South-East Asia, *Asian Survey*, Vol. XLIX, No. 5, pp. 790-791.
- Robert, K. & Joseph, N. (1989). *Power and Interdependence*, Boulder: Westview 1989, pp. 275-277.
- Smith M. A. (2000). *Russia and the Far Abroad 2000*, December, Camberley: CSRC, RMA Sandhurst.

China-Russia Relations after the Cold War

- Stephen Aris, (2011). *Eurasian Regionalism: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Trenin, D. (2012). *True Partners? How Russia and China See Each Other*, Centre for European Reforms.
- Weitz, R. (2007). Shanghai Summit Fails to Yield NATO-style Defence Agreement, *JIR*, August, pp. 41-42.