

## France and Pakistan Quest for Nuclear Deterrence: A Response to the Issue of National Security

**Dr. Humaira Masood Dar**

HOD

Department of Political Science  
GC Women University, Sialkot  
humaira.dar@gcwus.edu.pk

### **Abstract**

*The journey of state security from conventional deterrence to nuclear deterrence is covered with the death of millions during WW11. The attack of American nuclear bomb on Japan transformed the old balance of power system into balance of terror system and a race began among the nations to get nuclear deterrence, so that they could secure their 'existence' in the world arena. Nevertheless, the tragedy of the nuclear deterrence is that whenever a state 'acquired this (nuclear) capability, it involved with all its might to block the ways and means of other states to acquire it. History of the nuclear deterrence openly confirmed this hypothesis – it was either McMahon Act of 1946 or the declaration made by the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) in 1975 - both represent those conscious efforts which were made to keep away smaller plus rival states from nuclear power group. However, in reality these efforts were unsuccessful to restrict the proliferation of nuclear power. The American use of nuclear bombs in Japan in 1945 gave birth to two major issues which the policy makers needed to be answered – whether atomic power should be used again against any state and how to prevent other states to acquire it. The magnitude of destruction which world witnessed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki responded the first one positively negative but for the second the efforts are still in progress. In spite of all global efforts either collective or individual, the states which were determined to acquire the nuclear power, succeeded to achieve it like France and Pakistan. This research focused not only the roots of the obsession which forced France and Pakistan to be nuclear power and announced it but also explains their attitudes towards the use of nuclear power as security deterrence. Two major questions are tried to be answer in this research: Why did France and Pakistan obsess to achieve nuclear deterrence? How did they behave after achieving this technology? France and Pakistan (especially), were those states, which began to achieve their nuclear deterrence in that age when the world had two nuclear powers in case of France (US/USSR) and five in case of Pakistan (US/USSR/UK/FR/CH). All these powers were extremely obsessed to maintain the nuclear status quo in the world, to keep their monopoly and greatness in the world. French and Pakistani attitude towards the use of nuclear power as security deterrence depends on the perceived level of threat perception that's why France in 1990s even reached the conviction of Zero Option while for Pakistan nuclear security is still a First Option.*

**Key Words:** Nuclear, Deterrence, Security, Allies, Prestige

## **Introduction**

National Security defines as ability of a nation to “protect its internal values from external threat”.<sup>1</sup> This definition of the word National Security might be in comprehension of many in 21<sup>st</sup> century but when the journey of the state security turned from conventional deterrence<sup>2</sup> to nuclear deterrence after the WWII with the death of millions in Japan; it transformed the old balance of power<sup>3</sup> system into balance of terror system<sup>4</sup>. National Security has become a synonym of nuclear deterrence and this transformation began a race among the nations to get that power which secure their ‘existence’ in the world arena.

Nevertheless, the tragedy of the nuclear deterrence was that when a state ‘acquired this (nuclear) capability –it involved with all its might to block the ways and means of other states to acquire it. History of the nuclear deterrence openly confirmed this hypothesis – it was either McMahon act of 1946<sup>5</sup> or the declaration made by the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) in 1975<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Morton Berkowitz and P. G. Bock, *American National Security* (Free Press, 1965), x.

<sup>2</sup> Conventional deterrence was described as to prevent an attack of the enemy with non-nuclear and conventional methods like France faced Germany in 1870 and Pakistan to India in wars. Concept of deterrence is explained by the different internationalist theorist like Buzan explained it as 'the dissuasion of one adversary by another from undertaking hostile military action by convincing him that such an action would be unsuccessful or too costly since it would incur military counteraction.' Like India tried to do it in 1986 and 2001/2002 stands off when it put all its armies on Pakistan borders and Buzan also stress that “it should not be confused with defense”. Barry Buzan, *An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations* (Macmillan, 1987). But later Waltz explained it as: 'deterrence is achieved not through the ability to defend, but through the ability to punish'. Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better,” *Adelphi Papers*, no. 171 (1981).

<sup>3</sup> Balance of power is old European statecraft in which European states decided that no state or existing alliance has an overwhelming or overpowering status which can become a threat to the existing system. It was vague rather ambiguous system. European powers implemented it during 17<sup>th</sup> to 20<sup>th</sup> century successfully. Even bloc politic of cold war was also another shape of balance of power. For detail of this theory see M. Sheehan, *The Balance of Power* (Routledge, 1996).

<sup>4</sup> American nuclear explosion had given the birth of another theory which linked to the nuclear arm race between the powers. They threatened each other with the fear of damage or destruction which might be not equal to annihilation yet devastated. The perception that attack or provoking to the other state is beyond endurance automatically created a balance of terror. For detail study see A. J. C. Edwards, *Nuclear Weapons, the Balance of Terror, the Quest for Peace* (SUNY Press, 1986).

<sup>5</sup> An American Democrat, Senator Brien McMahon introduced in late 1945 some proposals in American parliament which after discussion in both house passed as an Act, named after the presentator, McMahon Act in 1946. This whole process organized the nuclear development, management and control authorities and to implement all this, The United States Atomic Energy Commission was established. The decision which turned this Act as bit *controversial* was that United States would not share Atomic Information with others not even with the

- both represented those conscious efforts which were made to exclude smaller plus rival states to be the part of nuclear power group. However, in reality these efforts were unsuccessful to restrict the proliferation of nuclear power.

American use of nuclear bomb in Japan in 1945 gave the birth of two major issues which the policy makers needed to be answered – whether atomic power should be used again against any state and how to prevent others states to acquire it. The magnitude of destruction which world witnessed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki<sup>7</sup> responded the first one positively negative but for the second the efforts are still going on.

In spite of all these global efforts for non-proliferation of nuclear capability either collective or individual, the states which were determined to acquire the nuclear power, succeeded to achieve it. This research focuses not only the roots of that *obsession* which forced France and Pakistan to be nuclear power and announced it but also explains their attitudes towards the use of nuclear capability as security deterrence. Two major questions are tried to answer in this research: Why did France and Pakistan obsess with the wish to achieve nuclear deterrence? How did they behave after achieving this technology?

France and Pakistan (specially), are those states, which began to achieve their nuclear deterrence in that age when the world had two nuclear powers in case of France (US/USSR) and five in case of Pakistan (US/USSR/UK/FR/CH). All these powers were extremely obsessed to

---


wartime allies. Later years, the Act was amended due to the need of time and first sharing with UK and Canada started, then through Atom for Peace for whole world.

<sup>6</sup> Nuclear supplier group was established in 1976 at the instigation of Henry Kissinger, American secretary of state. The objective was to combine international nuclear exporter to join hands to block the ways for further proliferation. Initially the Nuclear Supplier Group had seven members: Canada, West Germany, France, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In 1976-77, membership was expanded to fifteen with the admittance of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland. Twelve more nations joined up to 1990. China became a member in 2004. The European Commission participates as an observer. As of 2009, the NSG has 46 members and India would be next expected member.

<sup>7</sup> Hiroshima and Nagasaki, dense with population destroyed immediately after American nuclear attack. Over 90% building burned and demolished in Hiroshima and 1/3 of all building in Nagasaki was damaged. Of the estimated 300,000 people in Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, 140,000 died within hour or in following weeks of attack while in Nagasaki on 9 August 1945, some 70,000 among the estimated 270,000 present died. This immediate death and destruction had started a series of destruction which linked to radiation injury from ashes of death or black rain continued later on. For further details see Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science Inc, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Inc., 1982), 33.

maintain the nuclear status quo in the world, which was the source of their monopoly and greatness in the world. France and Pakistan's attitude towards the use of nuclear power as security deterrence depends on the perceived level of threat perception. France in 1990s even reached the conviction of Zero Option while for Pakistan nuclear security is still a First Option.

### **A Hexagon of Nuclear Deterrence for France and Pakistan**



### **The Passion for the Nuclear Deterrence: why?**

The story of Franco-Pakistan struggle to be nuclear powers is full of hardships and constraints including economic and political pressures from existing nuclear powers, although in different decade – France in 1950s and Pakistan in 1970s. The key question is that while both the states had apparent economic and security umbrella of America during the Cold War (1945-1990) either it was through NATO, SEATO or CENTO, why they decided to go with projects for their security which needed billions of dollars? The answer of this question has explained through the following reasons.

#### ***Security and Survival***

The security situation for Pakistan was more delicate than that of France in 1947.<sup>8</sup> The fear to be vulnerable against external threat and the

---

<sup>8</sup> The reason to start the analysis from 1947 is that although France had a history of many centuries but it won its independence from Germans nearly two years before (1945) because

weakness of the internal harmony created highest level of insecurity for both states (France & Pakistan) after the mid 1940s.

At the end of the World War II, although neighbouring German threat<sup>9</sup> was diminished due to its division into East and West Germany but rising Soviet power with communist ideology knocking at French doors with expansionist approach. The NATO alliance provided a relative security for France within European continent against Germany and communist Soviet Power but its colonial wars (1947-1962) in Southeast Asia and in Africa enhanced the existing sense of unreliability against the allies and opened many windows for its vulnerability against the enemy. The French unreliability on the allies is linked with French experience in two world wars.<sup>10</sup>

During the Cold War, France had two apprehensions; it might be made the cannon-fodder for the Anglo-Saxon powers in the event of a future war due to alliance commitment and those powers (Anglo-Saxon) would abandon Europe, and adopt a peripheral strategy<sup>11</sup> to liberate the continent. The experience of Suez crisis (1956) reinforced these apprehensions when Britain and Israel left France alone due to American pressure –to face the consequences.<sup>12</sup> France could not afford another devastating World War on its land that could any time definitely turn into a nuclear war due to the involvement of three nuclear powers (USA, USSR and Britain). To secure its

---

Germens occupied France in 1940 during WWII; whereas Pakistan had won its independence from British in 1947.

<sup>9</sup> After the unification of Germany in 1870, it had become a threat for French security, its leader Bismarck successfully isolate France in the European continent. This feeling of isolation and the presence of a powerful neighbor resulted in the two world wars in European continent.

<sup>10</sup> Anglo-American attitude towards France before both World Wars was relatively ignorant which caused heavy human and financial damage for the country. Even in 1940, Germany occupied France and its allies did nothing. Both times Americans joined the war when their own interest suffered.

<sup>11</sup> Usually when army plans to attack the enemy, they have certain options with them. One is the direct attack using maximum force against the main force of the enemy and defeat it one big battle. Americans preferred that way in WW-II. That's why American continued to support a major assault on France. When enemy is kept engaged in small battles on the periphery, and direct attack is avoided on enemy's main force and centre. In this strategy, the strength of the enemy is dispersed and he is defeated step by step. British supported this approach during WW-II. That's why British objected to major assault on France till 1944 and tried to engage Axis forces in Italy, Africa, etc. British preferred this peripheral strategy to maintain British traditional sphere of influence in the Mediterranean and to keep open the imperial lifeline to India, east Africa, and the Persian Gulf. Thomas J. McCormick, *America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After* (JHU Press, 1995), 36.

<sup>12</sup> Soviet nuclear threat and Arab Muslim rage specifically against western civilization were significant among them.

existence and to avoid becoming a pawn in Anglo-Saxon game – France decided to have those muscles (nuclear one) which could save it from becoming a victim of the forced decision.<sup>13</sup>

Pakistan's apprehension against the Indian threat raised its security level high when it had seen its (Indian) response against the unfavorable decisions of princely states (forceful action against Hyderabad, Junagadh, etc) in 1947. Kashmir dispute stamped Pakistan's insecure feelings. To meet its security needs, Pakistan joined the western security alliance SEATO and CENTO in mid 1950s under the American Umbrella. The ineffectiveness of these alliances against India proved within a short period of time (1965-1971) because the target of these alliances was communist states of Asia not India. The failure of western allies to protect Pakistan's geographical unity in 1971<sup>14</sup> forced it to search those muscles (Nuclear one) which ensure its existence from the future aggression.

Besides insecurity, another common factor helped France and Pakistan to reach the same conclusion - to be nuclear power - was the consecutive failures of their conventional forces to protect the geographical unity of the state.

French land army, the well recognized strongest army within Europe since the time of Napoleon1, had to face humiliated defeat in 1940 against Germans and it failed to protect its homeland. Later, in Indo-china, at Dien Bien Phu siege (1954), once again, it had to lay the arms against the irregular force of Vietnam liberation army. These tragedies further intensified the military weakness due to indecisive withdrawal from Suez war. Consequentially, French decision makers reached on one conclusion that they

---

<sup>13</sup> At Rambouillet Castle in 1959, de Gaulle justifies French desire and effort for nuclear deterrent to General Eisenhower in these words, "You, Eisenhower, would go to nuclear war for Europe because you know what its loss would mean and you are bound to us by special ties. As the Soviet Union develops the capability to strike with nuclear rockets the cities of North America, one of your unknown successors will decide to go to nuclear war only if there is a nuclear strike against North America. When that day comes, I or my unknown successor must have in hand the nuclear means to turn what the Soviets may want to be a conventional war into a nuclear war. I do not seek to compete with SAC or the Long Range Air Army, but I wish France to have the means of some tactical and strategic strike against the Soviet Union. The addition of another center of nuclear decision will multiply the uncertainties of the Soviet planners. You Americans could survive--for a short time--the loss of Western Europe. We Europeans could not. "General de Gaulle In Action:1960 Summit Conference," winter 1974, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/95unclass/Walters.html>.

<sup>14</sup> Pakistan dismembered and East Pakistan emerged as Bangladesh in 1971 war with India

had to change the tone of their peaceful nuclear program and transformed it to a weapon grade - to protect their geographical boundaries.

On contrary, Pakistan's confidence on its conventional military bit dwindled after 1965 war with India when consequential Tashkent Treaty had failed to solve the root cause of the conflict - Kashmir dispute. This semi-compromised treaty made the emerging politicians in Pakistan think some other way to equalize the Indian power in the region.<sup>15</sup> Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto prophesized after the Tashkent treaty that the next war against Pakistan could be a total war and therefore our plan should be to achieve the nuclear deterrence",<sup>16</sup> because answer of nuclear bomb can only be a nuclear bomb.<sup>17</sup>

The tragedy of 1971 when more than ninety thousand Pakistani soldiers laid down their arms and surrendered to India further strengthened the idea and consequently, the modest and still nascent nuclear program turned into weapon grade. This transformation made it a source of security and national sovereignty after 1971. So, it was right to say that Pakistan's nuclear option meant to deter the Indian nuclear threat although entered late in the political discourse of Pakistan,<sup>18</sup> yet when it was adopted, Pakistani psychology began to consider the security, independence and nuclear weapon as synonym.

This feeling of vulnerability further strengthened when Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and a proxy war between two powers started in Pakistan's neighborhood. The continuous attacks of Soviets and Afghan forces on Pakistani borders and a possible tripartite alliance among the USSR/India/Afghanistan raised the possibility of 1971- tragedy again – dismemberment of Pakistan. To deter all these security threats, Pakistan had one option –to be a nuclear power.

---

<sup>15</sup> Acquiring an independent nuclear capability also seemed essential for dealing with India as an equal on Kashmir. T.V Paul, *Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons* (Canada: McGill-Queen's Press - MQUP, 2000), 133.

<sup>16</sup> Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *The Myth of Independence* (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1969), 153.

<sup>17</sup> Khan, *Eating Grass*, 7.

<sup>18</sup> Haider K. Nizamani, *The Roots of Rhetoric: Politics of Nuclear Weapons in India and Pakistan* (Westport, C T: Praeger, 2000, 75.

### ***Pro-Active Scientific Community***

The role of an active nuclear scientific community is probably most important in Franco-Pakistan nuclear programs; the objective behind was mostly identical – scientific development and deterrence for the state. The early decade of both the states linked to the infrastructure development and a pacifist nuclear program, but the gradual politico-regional issues particularly linked to the security of the state became the source of the rise of those scientists who were supportive to the weaponization of the nuclear capability.

In France, nuclear scientists had established international recognition in the field of atomic research before the WWII. The political and military failure of France during the WWII gave a severe blow to their research development. They had dispersed but remained linked to the nuclear research either in England or in Canada. The American monopoly on nuclear research and raw material after joining the allied camp and non-recognition of French efforts in the field of Atomic development<sup>19</sup> had created irresistibility among French scientists. The American suspicions, due to main French scientist Frederic Joliot's communist attachment, also deeply wounded French susceptibility. That's why in July 1944, the French scientists rather than politicians urged French President de Gaulle to launch an atomic energy program.<sup>20</sup>

Pakistani nuclear scientists like France, had established their international fame before the beginning of the nuclear program led by the noble laureate Dr. Abdus Salam. The organic security threat from India when turned from conventional to nuclear – Pakistan took some time but adapted the need of rising modernity in deterrence. The East Pakistan tragedy and Indian explosion (1974) became the stimulus for that.

The practical existence of the concept (Pakistan Nuclear Program) and its organization is credited to Dr. Ishrat Usmani. However, it was Dr. Munir Ahmed Khan who insisted and later strengthened Dr. Usmani's foundations, to create deterrence against India. After Indian nuclear explosion, Dr. Abdul

---

<sup>19</sup> For the details of Anglo-Saxon attitude see ; Michel Pinault, "Naissance D'un Dessein : Frédéric Joliot Et Le Nucléaire Français (Août 1944-septembre 1945)/~~Birth of a Plan : Frédéric Joliot and French Nuclear Physics (august 1944-september 1945)," *Revue D'histoire Des Sciences* 50, no. 1 (1997): 3–48, doi:10.3406/rhs.1997.1273.

<sup>20</sup>Wolf Mendl, "The Background of French Nuclear Policy," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 41, no. 1 (January 1, 1965): 33.



Qadeer Khan's offer to serve Pakistan's nuclear program has linked to the same reasoning which was the driving force behind the French scientists to work for – security for the motherland.

The following events describe the significance of nuclear energy and the role scientists to promote it in their respective states.

Indo-Pakistan clash in 1965 changed Pakistan's President, General Ayub's approach a bit towards conventional deterrence but still he was not interested in the nuclearization of weapons. Yet this war and a meeting with Dr. Munir nuclearized his foreign minister Z.A. Bhutto's politics further. Dr. Munir Ahmad Khan – a Pakistani scientist who was working in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – met Z.A. Bhutto in Geneva and informed him about Indian advancement in nuclear field. He also highlighted the chances of Pakistan's availability for the nuclear capacity and insisted that Pakistan should have 'nuclear deterrence'.<sup>21</sup> Z.A. Bhutto was convinced but Munir Ahmed failed to persuade General Ayub during their London meeting in December 1966.<sup>22</sup> In spite of reluctance, General Ayub initiated the nuclear program and signed contracts with USA and Canada for nuclear cooperation which later become the milestones for the nuclear program.

Contrary to Pakistan, the French political and scientific community was more anxious about nuclear development. Their dependency on the allies for their liberation from Germans forced them to keep their eyes open and availed all opportunities for their comeback in global politics as a decision maker through nuclear power.

The secrecy of American nuclear program (Manhattan Project) and non-sharing of information with the allies caused irritation in French political and scientific community and the outcome was – a meeting between French scientists and the delegate of the free French army including de Gaulle in Ottawa, Canada in July 1944. *Frédéric Joliot-Curie, Bertrand Goldschmidt,*

---

<sup>21</sup> According to Munir Ahmed Khan, nuclear deterrence means, "a defensive measure to forestall nuclear blackmail and Indian hegemony". Samina Ahmed and David (1946-) Cortright, *Pakistan and the bomb : public opinion and nuclear options*, Notre Dame studies on international peace (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 56.

<sup>22</sup> Bhutto arranged an emergency meeting in which Munir Ahmed Khan met with President Ayub in London on December 1965. But the unsuccessful effort to convince Ayub for nuclear deterrence, forced Bhutto to say to Munir Ahmad, "don't worry, our time will come." Syed Abdul Quddus, *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: Politics of Charisma*. (Progressive Publishers, 1994), 126.

and Francis Perrin (all of them were working on Manhattan project in Montreal) met first in Ottawa with Free French delegate to Canada, Gabriel Bonneau on 11<sup>th</sup> July 1944 and informed him that - a weapon of extraordinary power, based on uranium, would be ready in one year, to be used first against Japan.<sup>23</sup> They also highlighted the strategic importance of the weapon which would give America considerable after war advantage in the world. They insisted that it was absolutely necessary to resume atomic research in France as rapidly as possible,<sup>24</sup> because – atomic energy was invariably not only associated with the economic reconstruction of a country, but also make a significant impact on defence.<sup>25</sup>

French scientist (Pierre Auger, Bertrand Goldschmidt and Jules Gueron) met De Gaulle as the President of French Provisional Government<sup>26</sup> and forced him for the recommencement of French Nuclear Program. After the meeting, de Gaulle remarked, “thank you, I have very well understood”.<sup>27</sup> This de Gaulle’s understanding led the foundations of “*le Commissariat à l’énergie atomique*”<sup>28</sup> (CEA) on October 8, 1945 through an ordinance.<sup>29</sup> It had a peaceful orientation, so there was no plan to build a nuclear weapon at the early stage.<sup>30</sup>

French nuclear program “.....foundation arose out of humiliating military defeats, a desire for the restoration of French pride, the development of France as an international power, and a mean through which France would restore its greatness and prestige.”<sup>31</sup> This Adam Deyoe’s justification for French nuclear struggle successfully explains Pakistan’s obsession for it, too.

---

<sup>23</sup>Bertrand Goldschmidt, *Atomic Rivals* (Rutgers University Press, 1990), 216.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

<sup>25</sup>Dominique Mongin, “Aux Origines Du Programme Atomique Militaire Français,” *Matériaux Pour L’histoire de Notre Temps* 31, no. 1 (1993): 14, doi:10.3406/mat.1993.404097.

<sup>26</sup>Goldschmidt, Bertrand, “The Supplies of Norwegian Heavy Water to France and Early Development of Atomic Energy,” 18. Winston Churchill kept this fact secret from de Gaulle during his stay in London

<sup>27</sup>Goldschmidt, *Le complexe Atomique Histoire Politique de l’Energie Nucléaire*, 71–72.

<sup>28</sup>English: Commission of Atomic Energy. Henceforth, it is abbreviated as CEA in French.

<sup>29</sup>Colard, Daniel, and Pierre Lefranc, “L’Aventure De La Bombe: De Gaulle Et La Dissuasion Nucléaire, 1958-1969” (Plon: paris, 1985), 23.

<sup>30</sup>Jeffrey Richelson, *Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea* (W. W. Norton & Company, 2007), 197.

<sup>31</sup>Adam Deyoe, *France and Greatness: The Development of the French Nuclear Program*, 1st ed. (Adam Deyoe, 2012), 1.

### ***Deterrence against Allies***

The attainment of nuclear capability for France and Pakistan has dual objectives, they wished to liberate themselves from the dependency of allies' security guarantees and secondly, they also wanted to have those muscles which forced their allies to intervene at that time when they were reluctant to help.

According to Walter Lipman, France wished to acquire the possibility of constraining the United States to intervene, even though it did not wish to do it to save Europe.<sup>32</sup> Walter Lipman could be right in his observation because during the World Wars America joined the war after enough destruction in Europe generally and French particularly. France could not afford it in future nuclear war, so they wanted to have that power which forced America to intervene to save Europe before total destruction.

This hypothesis was partly true for Pakistan because its shattered confidence on American security guarantees after mid 1960s forced it to have those muscles which made American intervention in Indo-Pakistan Conflict mandatory. Consequently, American active involvement during Kargil crisis in 1999 and Indo-Pak standoff in 2001/2002 proved the above mentioning hypotheses. Contrary to Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy against India, France has never needed to adopt nuclear tactic although it specifically links its use to the self-defence (Article 51 of UN charter).<sup>33</sup>

This nuclear strategy of both states (France and Pakistan) has its roots within the allies' attitude and approach. Through NATO, France had a security guarantee against its communist enemies but it had to fight against them in Vietnam and in Algeria partly alone. America was reluctant to support France there due to the involvement of French colonization issue. America preferred, again during Anglo-French Suez adventure - against Soviet nuclear threat – to use its financial leverage to force Britain to withdraw, leaving France alone. This French sense of diplomatic isolation further enhanced due to that “special relationship” which later propagated between the two Anglo-Saxon nations on

---

<sup>32</sup>Walter Lippmann, *Western Unity and the Common Market* (Little, Brown, 1962), 8.

<sup>33</sup>Bruno Tertrais, *Nuclear Deterrence in 2030 a French Perspective* (FRS, February 2007), 5–6, [http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/rd/essaiDissuasion2030\\_eng.pdf](http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/rd/essaiDissuasion2030_eng.pdf).

nuclear field. France joined EURATOM and signed nuclear cooperation deal with Israel to end this feeling of isolation.

For Pakistan, alliance with the West was a symbol of security guarantee against one and the only presumed cum realist adversary - India - but its expectations ended like bubbles during 1965 and 1971 wars. when the enemy was an immediate neighbor and allies were unpredictable and at distance, the choices of a state like Pakistan can neither be else than to equalize its powers with a nuclear weapon as an ultimate deterrence rather to accept a satellite status in the region. So it can be analyzed that the choice of atomic France is more in terms of competition between allies rather than the threat for an enemy<sup>34</sup> while in case of Pakistan it is an effort to survive among the fittest.

### **Nuclear Power Source of Status in the World**

The nuclear capability of the five UNSC permanent members with the gradual process is enough to prove the world that nuclear power and great power status has some close linkage. When this thought coupled with the statements of the leaders of those nuclear powers verified the belief, “the independent contribution ... put us where we ought to be, in the position of a great power” (Macmillan, British Prime Minister),<sup>35</sup> “a great state that does not have nuclear weapons when others do, does not command its own destiny”<sup>36</sup>(de Gaulle, French President). Even Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced that “we have a big bomb and now India is a nuclear power state (*means great power*)”<sup>37</sup> (italic added) These statements correlated the presence of nuclear weapon with the independence, sovereignty and a great power status in the world, in such a situation, a rational and resourceful state can't afford to deprive itself from a “great power” status.

So nuclear deterrence, in France was the answer of Charles de Gaulle announcement, “France cannot be France without greatness,” and in Pakistan, it fulfilled its thirst to have an equalizer status with India.<sup>38</sup>

---

<sup>34</sup>Maurice Vaisse, “Le Choix Atomique De La France (1945-1958),” *Vingtième Siècle. Revue D'histoire* 36, no. 1 (1992): 23.

<sup>35</sup>David Childs, *Britain Since 1945* (Routledge, 1994), 106.

<sup>36</sup>Thomas Graham, *Common Sense on Weapons of Mass Destruction* (UBC Press, 2004), 66.

<sup>37</sup>Syed F. Hasnat, *Global Security Watch—Pakistan* (ABC-CLIO, 2011), 16.

<sup>38</sup> Pakistan believes that through nuclear deterrence, it achieved a “great equalizer because its missile can hit most of India which minimize Indian conventional superiority and limited its

French position after the WWII, was equivalent to a middle sized power, devastated economically and psychologically, but still had certain aspects of global importance - its second biggest colonial empire and a permanent membership in the UNSC. France linked both the aspects to a great power status, yet, it failed to maintain its colonial empire and felt to encircle itself among the hostile rival powers during the first decade after the WWII.<sup>39</sup> It required some alternatives and the nuclear capability was the substitute which helped to maintain – the “incontestable prestige for France”<sup>40</sup> across the world and its international stature, through providing nuclear parity with Anglo-Saxon and Soviets.<sup>41</sup> De Gaulle’s motives for setting up the CEA in 1945 were fairly clear and centered on the independence and greatness of France and its mission in the world.<sup>42</sup> According to Pompidou (French President, 1969-1974) if *France did not maintain its nuclear program, it would be reduced to the within ten, fifteen and twenty years at most to the status of an underdeveloped country.*<sup>43</sup>

British nuclear blast in October 1952 also stamped French resolute for the nuclear weaponization. The old Anglo-French rivalry, although became a story of the past in 20<sup>th</sup> century but it was difficult for the French to see the rise of English in a field in which their scientists were excelled and which ensured them the super power status.

Pakistan’s creation as the biggest Muslim state and its unconditional support to the Muslim cause around the world gave it a different type of recognition in the Islamic world and since the beginning, it was considered as

---

earlier strategic deterrence to open a front on Pakistan’s vulnerable strategic underbelly (Punjab) like the previous wars. T. V. Paul, ed., *The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 14.

<sup>40</sup>Robert Grant, “French Defense Policy and European Security,” *Political Science Quarterly* 100, no. 3 (October 1, 1985): 411.

<sup>41</sup> Historian of international relations Jean-Baptiste Duroselle rejects that it is not just the history but “the prestige of a State is in fact a medium of exercising one’s influence over other States”, and as such, a tool of power.” Heuser, Beatrice. *Nuclear mentalities: strategies and belief in Britain, France, and the FRG*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998, p.99; but CIA report also confirmed this that France’s desire to get nuclear weapon linked to its wish to “restore French prestige and to reestablish France’s status as a great power”. “Nuclear Weapons Productions in Four Countries Likelihood and Consequences, No.100,” June 18, 1957, 5, [http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC\\_0000669241/DOC\\_0000669241.pdf](http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000669241/DOC_0000669241.pdf).

<sup>42</sup>Mendl, “The Background of French Nuclear Policy,” 29.

<sup>43</sup>Dorothy Maud Pickles, *The uneasy entente: French foreign policy and Franco-British misunderstandings* (London: Oxford U.P., 1966), 102.

a bridge between the two worlds - Western and Muslim. The leadership also emphasized Pakistan's role as the champion of Muslim cause and unity around the world which strengthened the above-mentioned hypothesis.

This status and recognition severely affected when Pakistan joined hands with the western alliances for its security needs in 1950s. It disapproved the Arab Muslim world where a widespread hatredness existed due to western (Anglo- French under American umbrella) imperial policies in the Middle East and Colonial Muslim world in Asia and Africa. This diplomatic isolation further enhanced due to the Indo-Pakistan clash in 1971 which truncated Pakistan less than half and weakened it psychologically while the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974 made it more traumatized because it added another hegemonic indication from Indian side. A nuclear India could force Pakistan to be its satellite like the other South Asian countries<sup>44</sup>: for Pakistan it was *an unimaginable presumption*. The answer of *this 'unique kind of anxiety'*<sup>45</sup> and isolation which Pakistan was facing in early 1970s was the escalation of the efforts to have such 'deterrence', which could ensure Pakistan's existence as a sovereign state and also forced other states to reinstate their relations with Pakistan. That could be done only through one technology: the nuclear one. So, unlike India which achieved nuclear power to strengthen its hegemonic tendencies, Pakistan's adaptation of nuclear weapon option was "more an act of desperation to build a weapon of last resort."<sup>46</sup> For Pakistan, the tragedy of 1971 proved that the conventional military equilibrium with India was not sufficient for the security of Pakistan in future. So the Z.A. Bhutto government in Pakistan (1971-1977) calculated that for the restoration of semi balance in South Asia, to elevate Pakistan's prestige in Muslim world and to establish personal supremacy on coup-prone army, nuclear deterrence was needed.<sup>47</sup> His calculations proved right consequently, the announced nuclear deterrence provided a different *sense of security* to Pakistan and Pakistanis in 1980s and

---

<sup>44</sup> Other South Asian states like Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Maldives in 1970s generally and at some extent presently totally dependent on India for their foreign policy formulation.

<sup>45</sup> After Indian blast Bhutto as prime Minister wrote a letter to UN secretary General, On 25 May 1974 in which he used that term and recalled that international community paid no heed on Pakistan's repeated warning about the nature of Indian nuclear programme.

<sup>46</sup> Shirin Tahir-Kheli, *India, Pakistan, and the United States: Breaking With the Past*. (Council on Foreign Relations, 1997), 72.

<sup>47</sup> Malik, *Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post-Soviet Dynamics, 1947-92*, 246.

being first Islamic country to be nuclear – also- gave it, a moral edge in the Islamic world.<sup>48</sup>

### ***Regional Determinant***

States, having nuclear capability, not only have succeeded in keeping an international standing but also thriving to maintain a regional supremacy – except the Southwest Asian region where three adjacent nuclear powers (China, India, and Pakistan) are surviving side by side. America, in American continent, France, in Western European and Russia, in Eastern European region blocked the possibility of any other nuclear rival, so that they could induce their desires in the relevant regions. French desire to contain rising German economic power and equalize British nuclear capability in the continent and Pakistan's need to stabilize its position in Middle Eastern region and equalize Indian military power had the same ends - the nuclear deterrence.

French attitude towards European Economic Committee (EEC) during de Gaulle era (1958-1969) represented that confidence which it had after nuclear blast (1960). Its, two rejection of British application for joining the EEC, its empty chair policy to get decisions in its favor in 1960s, its opposition to American Vietnam policies openly and an initiative to have détente with Soviets were the small consequences of French *independent* approach during the Cold War after achieving the nuclear capability.

Pakistan could not use its nuclear ability like France to raise its regional status and to solve its issues with its neighboring rivals. But its nuclear capability has given it not only a regional standing vis-a vis India but also among other South Asian states and in the Middle Eastern region. Pakistan's technical superiority and unconditional support to each Muslim cause in the past helped it to end Arab Worlds' cold behavior during alliance period.

The failure of Iraqi and Libyan efforts to get nuclear ability and success of Pakistan in this esoteric technology could facilitate Pakistan to enhance its influence and prestige by being first among its fellow Muslim

---

<sup>48</sup> Pakistani living in outside Pakistan could verify this expression as in France, meeting with some Maghrabain made me feel that they knew Pakistan only due to its nuclear ability. It is my personal observation.

nations.<sup>49</sup> Z.A. Bhutto believed that among the rich and security conscious Arab states...it [nuclear capability] enhances Pakistan's stature and importance incalculably.<sup>50</sup>

Pakistan also highlighted the idea in which Pakistan is considered as nuclear protecting shield not only for its territorial boundaries but also for safeguarding the ideological frontiers of the Muslim world".<sup>51</sup> Both above mentioned hypothesis are assumptions and practically, Pakistan never committed any deal with any Muslim state for providing them any type of nuclear security.

### **Nuclear power as an Energy Source**

At present, nearly 70 civil nuclear power reactors are under construction in 15 states.<sup>52</sup> Although, Fukushima tragedy in 2011 forced states to revisit their nuclear lust, in result, Italy has banned the use of nuclear power and Germany decided to close its nuclear power reactors until 2022. Developed states can make decisions like this in 21<sup>st</sup> century but in mid 20<sup>th</sup> century when the alternative fuel resources were limited, every state which could afford rushed to achieve civil use of nuclear technology to decrease its oil bill.

The use of nuclear power as energy source was another incentive for Pakistan to have this capability. In 1970s and 1980s, the propagation that it was the cheapest source of energy was quite common globally in spite of the dangers involved in it. Pakistan and France both kept this "use" on top.

France after oil crisis in 1973 planned to use this source as an alternative and now it is the biggest user of the nuclear energy as power generation.<sup>53</sup> Pakistan, since 1970 stressed this use due to the scarcity of its natural resources particularly in the 1980s when the government started the

---

<sup>49</sup>Robert G. Wirsing, *Pakistan's Security Under Zia* (Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), 114.

<sup>50</sup>Salmaan Taseer, *Bhutto, a Political Biography* (Vikas Pub. House, 1980), 154.

<sup>51</sup>Farzana Shaikh, "Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb: Beyond the Non-Proliferation Regime," *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 78, no. 1 (January 1, 2002): 48.

<sup>52</sup>For the detail of existing and under-construction reactors at global level consult, "Nuclear Power Reactors in the World," accessed April 4, 2014, [http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/rds2-33\\_web.pdf](http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/rds2-33_web.pdf).

<sup>53</sup>France derives 75% of its electricity from nuclear energy. It is the world's largest net exporter of electricity due to very low cost of generation and gains 3 billion euro from it. it exports Reactors, fuel products and services. 17% of French electricity acquire from recycled nuclear fuel. *Nuclear Power in France*, accessed February 16, 2013, <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf40.html>.



‘load shedding’ process to maintain a balance in supply and demand. Pakistan could not solve this issue like France and the situation in Pakistan has now reached on catastrophic position.<sup>54</sup>

### **Politics of National Security and Nuclear Deterrence**

*“Atom bomb and hydrogen bomb are great source of security. No one whether he is capitalist or a communist is going to calls an act worthwhile which is going to destroy the world”.*<sup>55</sup> (Lord Birdwood) *This belief has justified the proliferation in the world.*

The devastation which caused by the American use of nuclear weapon generated two types of approach in the world. One group<sup>56</sup> began to support the non use of the nuclear weapon – due to the fear of great Armageddon - linking it with insufficient technical experience to manage the crisis among the medium and small powers. Another group defies this argument and linked it with the monopolization of the major powers and supported the positivity of ‘nuclear deterrence’ to manage the global peace because of the frightenedly high cost of war.<sup>57</sup> The tragedy of the argument was that both groups were using the same quality of the weapon for the justification of their arguments, the awesome potential for the destruction.

Major Powers used their influence, pressures and sometimes control over the technology and raw material to block the means of other states to move towards nuclearization.<sup>58</sup> But they are partially successful because these efforts – when espoused with the belief that nuclear weapon is a strategic

---

<sup>54</sup> After years of mismanagement and lack of infrastructure, now Pakistan has been facing 15-20 hour load shedding and long lanes for CNG on roads. Pakistani government could not meet the rising needs of demand and supply. In 2012, the difference between demand and supply has reached 7,500 MW or nearly 40% of national demand in one time while generally it was 5,000 MW. Pakistan mainly depends on oil and gas for energy supply. Gas supply has also suffered 33% less in 2010 than 2009. All these shortage are badly affecting the business life in Pakistan which directly disturb the industrial growth.

<sup>55</sup> Lord Birdwood, “Pakistan in Global Strategy,” *Pakistan Horizon* 8, no. 2 (June 1, 1955): 65.

<sup>56</sup> Lewis A. Dunn, *Containing Nuclear Proliferation*, (Adelphi papers; 263) (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991). Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia,” *Asian Survey* 41, no. 6 (December 1, 2001): 1064–1086.

<sup>57</sup> Kenneth Neal Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better*, Adelphi Papers, No.171, (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981). John J. Mearsheimer, Barry, R. Posen and Scott D. Sagan supported that point of view.

<sup>58</sup> During Clinton era, a key American official admitted that Indian nuclear status and missile program was well -established and indigenous but for Pakistan the situation was delicate because it had to rely on equipment and technology acquired abroad. So Pakistan was more vulnerable than India during American sanctions. Strobe Talbott, “Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia,” *Foreign Affairs*, March 1, 1999, 115.

instrument and a vital source of great power status or prestige – every attempt for non- proliferation has been collapsed. This approach has given a new life to that resort in which the nuclear war is considered as instrument of diplomacy.<sup>59</sup>

### **Franco- Pakistan Approach towards Nuclear Security**

Nuclear diplomacy and nuclear security is a part of statecraft for France and Pakistan. Although in 1994, French announced that, “France does not currently have any *specified adversaries* .....”<sup>60</sup> (*Italic added*) yet it launched a series of nuclear tests in 1995-1996. This French action was considered as a precursor of Indo-Pakistan nuclear blasts in 1998.

The practical use of nuclear power as diplomacy depends on the level of threat in which a state survived. So, in the course of French nuclear history, one can find that they never threatened any of their enemy for nuclear attack. Why did France adopt this attitude? The answer comes from its security guarantees which it had after WWII for all existing threats: centuries-old enmity with Britain changed into an alliance, the neighboring threat of Germany diminished due to its division between East and West Germany, and against Soviet Communist threat – American Umbrella in the form of NATO forces. So, if it is said that the underlined objective of France to have nuclear weapon was that, they could force Americans to intervene in any European affair where it was reluctant through nuclear war threat, seemed to be true.<sup>61</sup>

But for Pakistan, the story is bit different. It is reported that, “*India threatened three times for nuclear attack, two times from Pakistan, first time 1987, second in 1990 and once when US threatened to send its nuclear warship in Bay of Bengal (in 1971)*”.<sup>62</sup>

---

<sup>59</sup>Hedley Bull, “Rethinking Non-Proliferation,” *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 51, no. 2 (April 1, 1975): 176.

<sup>60</sup>“Livres Blancs Sur La Défense 1994 (France),” Juin 1994, 73, <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/944048700/index.shtml>, [http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/cgibin/brp/telstats.cgi?brp\\_ref=944048700&brp\\_file=0000.pdf](http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/cgibin/brp/telstats.cgi?brp_ref=944048700&brp_file=0000.pdf).

<sup>61</sup>Americans has the worst fear that WWII was triggered by the European generally and French particularly - there early opposition of French nuclear program based on that hypothesis. For detail of the concept see, Carsten Holbraad and Australian National University Dept of International Relations, *Super Powers and World Order* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1971).

<sup>62</sup>“Bharat Teen Bar Atmi Hamly Ki Dhamki Ka Shikar Hova/three Times in the Past India Had Been Threatened for Nuclear Attack,” August 2012,

The hard-core reality of the South Asian politics was that Pakistan could not afford an arm race with India in conventional armament, but it was different in nuclear field. The ability to inflict unacceptable damage played an important role in creating a successful deterrence. So, nuclear capability in fact, became a weapon of deterrence for Pakistan reduced the adversary to silence or paralysed its conventional superiority. After the nuclear blast of 1998, the conventional war has become unthinkable between the two old rivals of South Asia.<sup>63</sup>

According to Pakistani diplomat, Iqbal Akhund after Indian explosion in 1974, one of his western colleagues in the UN, said, one would have expected that in *this* particular field Pakistan would have been first.<sup>64</sup> His argument was felt to be justified because being a smaller and weaker state – Pakistan had more strategic motive to rely on nuclear weapon to neutralize its disadvantages in size and resources. This discussion also indicates the general prevailed psychology about the nuclear bomb – a smaller state having a regional and neighbouring rival if wished to sustain as an independent nation has only one alternative– to become a nuclear power. Being a comparatively smaller and insecure state in the Sub-Continent, when India exploded its ‘Peaceful Nuclear Explosion’ in 1974, then Pakistan had no option except to nuclearize itself.

Although before going to the nuclear way, Pakistan tried to get nuclear guarantee from the western nuclear powers and Pakistan Prime Minister, Z. A. Bhutto and President, Zia repeatedly assured west - if there was no problem in conventional weapon supply than Pakistan could avoid the nuclear deterrence. Z. A. Bhutto, during his visit to America in 1975 made a direct link between the nuclear program and arms aid and said if Washington met his requirement in conventional arms, he was ready to accept international safeguards for nuclear program,<sup>65</sup> and Zia, during an interview to an American TV channel

---

[http://express.com.pk/epaper/PoPupwindow.aspx?newsID=1101601877&Issue=NP\\_LHE&Date=20120824](http://express.com.pk/epaper/PoPupwindow.aspx?newsID=1101601877&Issue=NP_LHE&Date=20120824).

<sup>63</sup>John F. Burns, “On Kashmir’s Dividing Line, Nuclear Fears Enforce Calm,” *New York Times*, June 14, 1998, <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/14/world/on-kashmir-s-dividing-line-nuclear-fears-enforce-calm.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>; Steve Coll, “The Force of Fear in South Asia,” *The Washington Post*, June 8, 1998.

<sup>64</sup>Iqbal Akhund, *Memoirs of a Bystander: A Life in Diplomacy* (OUP Pakistan, 1997), 261.

<sup>65</sup>Niloufer Mahdi, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1971-1981: The Search for Security* (Lahore: Ferozsons (Pvt.) Limited, 1999), 160.

said if America continued its assistance, Pakistan would not make the atom bomb.<sup>66</sup>

Pakistan's nuclear history although started during the 1960s but it was able to use its deterrence as an instrument of security in the mid 1980s. India had planned the biggest army exercise near Pakistani border, named as Operation Brass Tacks<sup>67</sup> in November 1986. The threat of war, said to be cancelled due to Pakistani President's dual policy, at one side by using cricket diplomacy<sup>68</sup> and on the other side "informing Indian Prime Minister about Pakistan's nuclear capability".<sup>69</sup> This time nuclear deterrence saved the South Asia another open war unlike the previous three ones, in 1948, 1965, and 1971.

After 9/11, when India tried to follow American philosophy of pre-emptive strike and presuming Indian parliament attack,<sup>70</sup> similar to World Trade Centre attack, put all its army on Pakistan border, Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's President, during that standoff in 2001/2002, while addressing the nations said, "we don't want war. But if war is thrust upon us, we would respond with full might, and gave a befitting reply".<sup>71</sup> In April talking to German news paper *Der Spiegel*, he threatened India the use of nuclear

---

<sup>66</sup>Ayesha Siddiq-Agha, *Pakistan's Arms Procurement and Military Build-Up 1979-99: In Search of a Policy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 95.

<sup>67</sup> A plan was put into operation in the fall of 1986 to intimidate and embarrass Pakistan on the battlefield. Apparently, India planned to convert its triennial military exercise, code name Brass tacks, into an actual military action against Pakistan's Sind and then follow it up with Trident, the operation to free Pakistan held Kashmir. But Pakistan army also started to move troop with the Indian army movement. But crisis was averted due to Pakistani leadership's diplomacy of cricket. Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan: The Continuing Search For Nationhood*, 2 Rev Upd (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 194.

<sup>68</sup> In 1986-87, under the severe military tussle between the India and Pakistan prevailed and young Indian prime Minister could not afford to visit Pakistan or invited Zia to come to India. Pakistani general used the chance of India/Pakistan cricket match and visited India which broke the ice which covered the relations. Anthony Hyman, Muhammad Ghayur, and Naresh Kaushik, *Pakistan: Zia and After* (Abhinav Publications, 1989), 63.

<sup>69</sup> A.Q. Khan said to tell an Indian journalist that Pakistan had already achieved nuclear weapon capability. Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies*, 1st ed. (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 284-285.

<sup>70</sup> On 13 December 2001, few terrorists attacked Indian parliament when the parliament was in session. One civilian and dozens of other were killed. India blamed some banned Pakistani organization for the attack and massed up its army on Pakistani frontiers. It created a nuclear standoff between the neighboring powers.

<sup>71</sup>"Pakistan: We Don't Want War," *The New York Times*, May 28, 2002.

weapon. The interview was widely published<sup>72</sup> and an open war between the two averted again.

Although the retreat from Kargil and unconditional submission of American demand in 2001 considered diplomatic weakness on behalf of Pakistan but the efficacy of nuclear deterrence is still unchallengeable in Pakistani psyche.

Another part of Pakistan nuclear security policy is based on the rejection of any international pressure which target particularly Pakistan. As Pakistani Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar said, “We will not accept any pressure (international) which was exclusively directed against Pakistan”.<sup>73</sup> That’s why Pakistan always linked its signature of NPT with the Indian willingness.

### **Conclusion**

*“A nuclear power plant is coming to be as vivid token of national self-assertion as a flag and a steel mill”.*<sup>74</sup>

French and Pakistani journey towards nuclear deterrence has many common aspects. National humiliation, international isolation and national identity<sup>75</sup> are three underlined theme which commonly forced Pakistan and France to face global pressure to pursue their objectives for the national interest regarding achievement of nuclear capability.

Both had patriotic, energetic scientific community to become a stimulus against the uninterested military hierarchy which considered conventional approach best until certain national and international setbacks forced them to change their opinion. Suez crisis and British nuclear blast for France and the debacle of East Pakistan in 1971 and Indian nuclear explosion in 1974 for Pakistan are those milestones which led them to be nuclear.

Pakistan and France have different approach in the use of their nuclear deterrence. Pakistan used nukes as “first option” but France always kept it in “proportional deterrence”. This difference lies due to that unseen security guarantee which American presence in Europe has given to France which it always denied.

---

<sup>72</sup>“Musharraf Ready to Use Nuclear Arms,” *The Guardian*, April 6, 2002, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/apr/06/pakistan.rorymccarthy>.

<sup>73</sup>“Le Pakistan Dément Avoir La Bombe Atomique,” *Le Monde*, August 4, 1993.

<sup>74</sup>Michael Mandelbaum, *A Nuclear Export Cartel*, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Inc., 1977), 42.

<sup>75</sup>Khan, *Eating Grass*, 7.

Pakistan, with conventional military balance unable to maintain its position in the region, so Pakistan needs an “equalizer”.<sup>76</sup> Its nuclear capability provides that equalizer which Pakistan achieved facing all the global pressures.

French non-proliferation efforts after 1990 indicates - when its feeling of minimizing security threat established - that the sense of security for a vulnerable state leads it towards de- nuclearization. Pakistan may be next “champion of de-nuclearization” when it will feel secure in its borders in general and on eastern front particularly.

---

<sup>76</sup>Ganguly, *India's Foreign Policy Retrospect and Prospect*, 2012.